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On the Will of Preservation

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Introduction

There are countless artworks and other objects of cultural heritage that have been destroyed, intentionally or unintentionally, over the course of history. This fact seems to call into question the categorical imperative for conservation that Cesare Brandi (1906–88) put forward in his theory of conservation (*Teoria del restauro*, 1963). Brandi – an art historian, art theorist, critic, and poet¹ – is one of the most cited names in conservation theory, but this particular issue has received surprisingly little attention among Brandi scholars. Brandi claimed that when an individual encounters an artwork they ‘feel *immediately* an imperative [...] for conservation’.² Yet one might ask whether Brandi’s imperative has anything to do with what is happening in the real world or is there a serious flaw in his reasoning?

Cesare Brandi’s *Teoria del restauro*

It should be noted that Brandi theoretically deals only with artworks in his book, which can be considered a shortcoming.³ Brandi’s theory of conservation is connected to his art theory, which is based on semiotics and phenomenology; he has been influenced by philosophers such as Benedetto Croce (1866–1952), Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976),

- 1 Brandi published monographs on Giorgio Morandi (1941), Duccio (1951), and Giotto (1983). He wrote several art theoretical studies, on painting (*Carmine o della pittura*, 1962), on sculpture (*Arcadio o della scultura*, 1956), on architecture (*Eliante o dell’architettura*, 1956), and on poetry (*Celso o della poesia*, 1957). His theoretical work culminated in three works: *Segno e immagine* (1960), *Le due vie* (1966), and *Teoria generale della critica* (1974). Brandi served for a long time as director of Italy’s most important conservation institute *Istituto Centrale del Restauro* (ICR), in Rome (currently *Istituto Superiore per la Conservazione ed il Restauro* (ISCR)).
- 2 I use the second edition of *Teoria del restauro* (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1977) as my reference. The English edition of the book, translated by Cynthia Rockwell, was published in 2005, *Theory of Restoration*, edited by Giuseppe Basile (Firenze: Nardini Editore). A more correct translation for the title would be *Theory of Conservation*.
- 3 Brandi states that the concept of conservation is not to be articulated ‘on the basis of the practical procedures in which it is carried out, but in relation to the work of art as such from which it receives its qualification’. Cesare Brandi. *Restoration. Theory and Practice*. Edited by Giuseppe Basile. Associazione Internazionale per la storia e l’attualità del restauro – per Cesare Brandi. Palermo: AISAR editore, 2015, 16, <http://www.aisarweb.com/images/ebooks/brandi-restoration-theory-and-practice.pdf> (accessed 6 January 2023).

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80) and Jacques Derrida (1930–2004).⁴ The concept of presence is crucial in it – that is the immediate presence of the artwork that is distinct from the *parousia* of the factual existence. Brandi underlines that the artwork does not signify: it ‘presentifies’.⁵ Regardless of the date of creation of the artwork, it ‘is not given in the past [...] [but] in the present’.⁶ Brandi refers to this ‘pure reality’ (*realtà pura*) using his neologism *astanza*, or ‘adstance’ (a word derived from the Latin, *adstare*, ‘proximity’) and contrasts it with *flagranza* or the ‘flagrance’ of existential and empirical reality.⁷ Brandi cites John Dewey’s book *Art as Experience* (1934): ‘A work of art [...] is actually and not just potentially a work of art when it lives in some individualised experience. As a piece of parchment, of marble, or canvas, it remains (subject, however, to the ravages of time) self-identical throughout the ages. But as a work of art, it is recreated every time it is aesthetically experienced. This means that, until such a re-creation or recognition – in Brandian terms, *riconoscimento* – occurs, the work of art is only potentially a work of art [...]. It is simply a piece of parchment, or marble or canvas.’⁸

Brandi did not address this distinction in his theory of conservation, but it is central to his concept of art. In Brandian terms, the conservation of an artwork means preserving its pure form. Paradoxically, the physical materials of the artwork, on which the conservation treatments must exclusively focus, are secondary to this – physical matter is completely subordinate to image; its only function is to act as a medium for the manifestation of the image. This gives rise to the requirement that conservation must aim to preserve the material of the artwork for as long as possible.⁹

The moral injunction to act

Brandi’s *categorical imperative for conservation* has its origin in the concept of the categorical imperative that Immanuel Kant discussed mainly in his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785/86) and his *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788). In these treatises, Kant examined the criteria for the general determination of the will, which, according to him, are subject to several practical rules. Kant made an important distinction between maxims, or codes of conduct, in which the subject feels that it applies only to his or her own will, and objectives, that is, practical rules, where the condition is considered to apply to every rational being. In Kantian terms, the rational actor has no choice but to follow such rules because they represent the objective principle of reason.¹⁰

4 See, e.g. Paolo D’Angelo. *Cesare Brandi. Critica d’arte e filosofia*. Macerata: Quodlibet, 2006.

5 Cesare Brandi. *Les deux voies de la critique*. Trans. Paul Philippot. Bruxelles: Vokar, 1989, 51.

6 Cited by Massimo Carboni in his *Cesare Brandi. Teoria e esperienza dell’arte*. Milano: Jaca Book, 2004, 44–45.

7 Paul Philippot. ‘The Phenomenology of Artistic Creation according to Cesare Brandi’, in Cesare Brandi. *Theory of Restoration*. Edited by Giuseppe Basile. Firenze: Nardini Editore, 2005, 30; Giuseppe Basile. *Teoria e pratica del restauro in Cesare Brandi*. Saonara: Il Prato Editore, 2007, 56. On this distinction crucial to Brandi’s thinking, which he does not, however, discuss in his theory of conservation, see Brandi’s *Teoria generale della critica*. Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1998. Stefano Gizzi has compared *astanza* to Walter Benjamin’s notion of *aura*, in his ‘The Relationship Between Brandi’s “Astanza” and Benjamin’s “Aura” and its Influence on the Restoration of Monuments’, in J. Delgado & J.M. Mimoso (eds.), *Theory and Practice in Conservation*. Proceedings of the International Seminar. Lisbon: Laboratório Nacional de Engenharia Civil, 2006, 73–86.

8 Brandi, *Theory of Restoration*, 48. Brandi’s term *riconoscimento* has a thematic connection to what Étienne Souriau called ‘instauration’. That is ‘a process that elevates that which exists to an entirely different level of reality and splendour [...]. “To instaure” does not so much refer to the act of creation as it does to the “spiritual” establishing of something, ensuring it a “reality” within its own genre.’ Peter Pál Pelbart. ‘Towards an Art of Instauring Modes of Existence that “do not exist”’, <https://desarquivo.org/> (accessed 31 December 2022).

9 Brandi, *Theory of Restoration*, 49.

10 Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings of Moral Philosophy*. Trans. Lewis White Beck. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1949, 130; Allen W. Wood. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 154–73.



Beeldstorming in de Nederlanden. 50. p. 4.

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Reinier Vinkles (I), after Jacobus Buys, *Iconoclasm in a Church*, 1566, 1786, etching, 23.5cm x 15.1cm
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam

Photo: Rijksmuseum, <http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.443190>

Kant has been criticised on the basis that the categorical imperative is unable to provide a guide to ethical conduct – that one cannot derive moral action from a mere concept that is empty of content and therefore does not tell us how to act, that ‘there is a crucial gap in Kant’s derivation of the formula from its mere concept’.¹¹ If such a gap exists, Kant cannot legitimately move from the concept, which itself cannot provide a guide to action, to the more fruitful formulation of the categorical imperative. The philosopher Jacqueline Mariña suggests that if such a gap exists and ‘if it cannot be bridged, then Kant’s ethics remains empty, unable to provide any significant criterion for moral action’.¹²

If this is true, can the same criticism be applied to Brandi’s categorical imperative of conservation? According to Salvador Muñoz Viñas, one of the most well-known conservation theorists today, it can. The fact that countless artworks have been mistreated, even deliberately destroyed, would seem to be proof of this. Muñoz Viñas is very suspicious about the categorical imperative of conservation: he reckons that if there were such an imperative, it must be conditional¹³ – in Kantian terms, hypothetical. Thus Muñoz Viñas suspects that an “‘immediate moral imperative” to conserve every artwork is doubtful, but even if it exists, it would have to be acknowledged that it is often ignored [...]’.¹⁴

This is not, however, a sustainable argument: any law retains its lawfulness *only* because it can be violated – the law can be obeyed, but it can just as well not be followed, because we have free will. As Jacqueline Mariña points out, ‘mere contracausal freedom is not enough, [...] what is required is the much stronger sense of freedom – transcendental freedom’, i.e., ‘independence from sensuously conditioned motives in the determination of the will’.¹⁵ Here she follows the Kant scholar Henry E. Allison, who has said that ‘(t)he selection of a maxim can never be located in an impulse, instinct, or anything “natural”; rather, it must always be sought in a higher order maxim and, therefore, in an act of freedom’.¹⁶ He sees free will as a necessary and sufficient condition of the categorical imperative.¹⁷ It seems that Muñoz Viñas does not give enough weight to the importance of the transcendently free will.

Brandi’s claim, that when an individual encounters an artwork s/he ‘feels immediately an imperative [...] for conservation’¹⁸ – the silent voice of conscience, which is pure utterance without anything uttered¹⁹ – is consistent with Kant’s categorical imperative. One word must be emphasised here: ‘immediately’ (*immediatamente*). That means that the content of this categorical imperative, in Henry E. Allison’s words, ‘can be derived *immediately* from the mere concept of such an imperative’.²⁰ It is not hypothetical, i.e., dependent on any contingent circumstances in which the imperative is applied.

Just like Kant’s categorical imperative, Brandi’s categorical imperative of conservation does not tell us what to do – one cannot find in his conservation theory a single practical instruction on how to act in each concrete situation. His imperative acts as a potential that opens a space for action. I suggest that we could call this open potential

11 This ‘emptiness charge’ has been presented by, among others, Hegel. Jacqueline Mariña. ‘Kant’s Derivation of the Formula of the Categorical Imperative: How to Get It Right’, *Kant-Studien*, 89 (2), 1998, 170; Wood, *Hegel’s Ethical Thought*, 154–73.

12 Mariña, ‘Kant’s Derivation of the Formula of the Categorical Imperative’, 170.

13 Salvador Muñoz Viñas. ‘What is Conservation? Reflections on Cesare Brandi’s *Teoria del restauro*’. Unpublished, unpaginated manuscript. Author’s archive. Muñoz Viñas also criticises Brandi’s *Teoria* in his article (where he does not, however, discuss the categorical imperative of conservation) “‘Who is Afraid of Cesare Brandi?” Personal reflections on the *Teoria del restauro*’, *CeROArt [Online]*, HS | Juin 2015, <https://doi.org/10.4000/ceroart.4653> (accessed 6 January 2023).

14 Muñoz Viñas, ‘What is Conservation?’

15 Mariña, ‘Kant’s Derivation of the Formula of the Categorical Imperative’, 173.

16 Henry E. Allison. ‘Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis’, *The Philosophical Review*, XCV, (3) (July 1986), 412.

17 Henry E. Allison. *Kant’s Theory of Freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 201–13.

18 Brandi, *Theory of Restoration*, 49.

19 Bernard Baas. *De la chose à l’objet. Jacques Lacan et la traversée de la phénoménologie*. Leuven: Peeters Vrin, 1998, 165–73.

20 Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Freedom*, 211.

a ‘quasi-transcendental’ of ‘preservability’²¹ – it makes preservation possible but does not guarantee that it takes place.²² So, in order to preserve a damaged art object, it cannot remain intact: its physical state must change to some extent. In the past, one of the principles of conservation was the ideal of minimum intervention, according to which the measures applied to the artefact to be conserved should be limited to a minimum. Muñoz Viñas has shown that this ideal is actually opposed to the principle of conservation.²³ From another perspective, if each and every artefact was preserved, eventually we would be unable to preserve anything. Conservation only preserves the meanings of an artefact most valued at the time.

The constitution of conservation objects

So, how can we define this strange activity called conservation that preserves but does not preserve everything? Brandi emphasised that conservation is a ‘methodological moment’ that does not depend on the physical materials of the artwork – its *flagranza* – but on its ontological recognition as an artwork.²⁴ In his book, *Contemporary Theory of Conservation* (2005)²⁵ Muñoz Viñas mentions that the definition of conservation cannot be formed only on the basis of the conservator’s work and its aims – this is in line with Brandi, who states that ‘even when the work undergoes a stage in the restoration process that is common to other products of human activity, this stage is merely ancillary to the treatment’s purpose’.²⁶ However, while Brandi considers it crucial that the object of the treatment is an artwork, Muñoz Viñas emphasises that the treatment is carried out on the entity, which he calls a ‘conservation object’.²⁷ Such an object is constituted. We return to the theme of recognition. He emphasises that the ‘same activity can qualify either as conservation or as maintenance/repairing/servicing even if it is performed upon the very same object’.²⁸ Another conservation theorist, Giorgio Bonsanti, has suggested that ‘it is precisely the performer of the act of conservation who determines whether what he is doing can be described as restoration. Paradoxically, according to this manner of dealing with the problem, one has restoration if what is done, is done by a restorer; so that the basic question does not concern the object so much as the subject.’²⁹ Here it must be pointed out that it is *not* the same object but an object that has undergone an essential change comparable to the Catholic dogma of

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- 21 The term ‘preservability’ is inspired by Samuel Weber’s book *Benjamin’s -abilities* (Harvard University Press, 2010), in which the author focuses on the suffixes Walter Benjamin introduced in his oeuvre: reproducibility, translatability, criticizability, citability, etc., and which Weber considers to have the function of quasi-transcendentals.
- 22 Preservability can be compared to expressions of conservation ethics such as the logically contradictory ideal of reversibility of conservation and restoration treatments (for which the concept of *retreatability* has since been proposed as a replacement). Salvador Muñoz Viñas. ‘Minimal Intervention Revisited’, in Alison Richmond and Alison Bracker (eds.), *Conservation. Principles, Dilemmas and Uncomfortable Truths*. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2009, 47–59; Barbara Appelbaum. ‘Criteria for Treatment: Reversibility’, *Journal of the American Institute of Conservation*, 1987, 65–73.
- 23 Muñoz Viñas, ‘Minimal Intervention Revisited’, 47–59.
- 24 Giorgio Bonsanti. ‘Towards a New Definition of Restauero’, in J. Delgado & J.M. Mimoso (eds.), *Theory and Practice in Conservation*. Proceedings of the International Seminar. Lisbon: Laboratório Nacional de Engenharia Civil, 2006, 7–13; Giorgio Bonsanti. ‘Riparare l’arte’, *OPD Restauero*, (9), 1997, 109–12.
- 25 In his book, Muñoz Viñas refers to ideas about conservation developed after 1980 as modern conservation theory, distinguishing them from the classical conservation theories of which he considers Cesare Brandi to be one of the representatives. Salvador Muñoz Viñas. *Contemporary Theory of Conservation*. Oxford: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005, xi–xii.
- 26 Brandi, *Theory of Restoration*, 48.
- 27 Muñoz Viñas, *Contemporary Theory of Conservation*, 28.
- 28 Muñoz Viñas, *Contemporary Theory of Conservation*, 29.
- 29 Giorgio Bonsanti. ‘After Brandi – Umberto Baldini and the Modern Theory of Conservation – Restoration in Italy’, *Protection of Cultural Heritage*, 8 (2019), (29–36) 33.



Hangng a painting at the Ateneum Art Museum, Helsinki

Photo: Finnish National Gallery / Jenni Nurminen

transubstantiation: its accidents – its perceptible appearance – has remained the same, but its substance has changed. This can be compared to what Brandi says about the relationship between *flagranza*, the existential reality, and *astanza*, the ‘pure reality’ of the artwork. One example he gave was that of a tram ticket that Kurt Schwitters (1887–1948) included in one of his collages: ‘(T)he tram ticket remains a tram ticket in a collage; but it is shot down, unused, equivalent to be neutralised,³⁰ suspended from “utensilhood” and therefore from the significance that corresponded to it in its earlier everyday usage.’ Brandi raised as another example the still-life paintings of Giorgio Morandi (1890–1964), in which the artist used a dusty bottle as his starting point.³¹ According to Brandi, the artist performs an act comparable to Husserl’s *epoché*. Through the constitution of the object (*costituzione d’oggetto*), and the subsequent formulation of the image (*formulazione d’immagine*), the meaning of the tram ticket, or the dusty bottle, changes. They acquire a different meaning from the one they carried earlier: now ‘only chromatic, luminous and plastic relations count’.³²

30 Philippot, ‘The Phenomenology of Artistic Creation’, 39; Brandi, *Teoria generale della critica*, 63–64. Brandi is referring to the Husserlian ‘neutrality modification’, see Edmund Husserl. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*. Trans. F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983, §109, 257–59.

31 Philippot, ‘The Phenomenology of Artistic Creation’, 39; Brandi. *Teoria generale della critica*, 63–64.

32 Philippot, ‘The Phenomenology of Artistic Creation’, 39; Brandi, *Teoria generale della critica*, 63–64; Basile, *Teoria e pratica del restauro in Cesare Brandi*, 56–57.

In the same way, when an artwork ends up in the hands of a conservator, s/he performs an act comparable to this – with the notable difference that they do not participate in the artist’s creative act. This also takes place with other artefacts to be conserved and restored than artworks. An artefact constituted as a conservation object is treated differently from a mere real thing, from which it may not differ in any way in terms of its perceivable properties – it can no longer be handled and treated as before. As Muñoz Viñas says: ‘(I)t is not allowed to evolve in the same manner as common, non-conservation objects, nor can it be repaired, updated, or trashed as are most non-conservation objects.’³³ Now other values, which are relevant to its new status, are attached to it.³⁴ The importance of the context must also be taken into account: an artefact can become a conservation object only in a certain social, cultural heritage context, affected by certain agents.³⁵ This object of conservation is an object towards which the conservator’s intentional consciousness is directed, i.e., a correlate generated by what Muñoz Viñas calls ‘conservation-conscious behaviour’³⁶ – which in turn can be compared to what Kant referred to with the term *Gesinnung*, a moral disposition. Conservation objects, which in Kantian terms act as the determining ground of the will to preserve, are thus objects of pure practical reason.³⁷ The determining ground of such a will is not the physical artefact to be treated, but only the lawful *pure form*, which limits the maxims based on personal inclinations in order to reach the generality of the law.³⁸ The philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy has noted that ‘[e]xistence can understand its essence [...] as destruction of existence’.³⁹ The will for preservation is grounded on a decision in favour of existence.

Only a small proportion of physical items can become such objects – an artefact must have certain characteristics to become an agent that initiates a causal sequence of becoming such.⁴⁰ However, just as we cannot always tell from the observable properties of an artefact whether it is an artwork or just a ‘mere real thing’ (I’m referring to Arthur C. Danto’s theory of indiscernibles)⁴¹, we cannot infer from the observable properties of physical objects whether or not they are prone to become conservation objects. Therefore, do conservation objects have any common feature? According to Muñoz Viñas, what they have in common is that they all have a strong symbolic value: ‘[T]he more powerful a symbol, the more likely it is to become a conservation object.’⁴²

Conservation problems as categorical imperatives

Conservation objects initiate problems that we do not encounter with mere real things. Usually, problems are understood in an empirical sense. Referring to Gilles Deleuze, the philosopher Levi Bryant argues that problems are generally conceived in the ‘inverted image of their solution’, containing ‘all the properties of the solution in an unrealised form’.⁴³ He

33 Muñoz Viñas, *Contemporary Theory of Conservation*, 29.

34 Muñoz Viñas mentions art value, aesthetic value, historical value, use value (for instance, how artworks are used in museum exhibitions), research value, educational value, age value, newness value, sentimental value, monetary value, associative value, commemorative value, and rarity value. See also Barbara Appelbaum. *Conservation Treatment Methodology*. Abington-on-Thames: Routledge, 2007, 89–115.

35 Alfred Gell. *Art and Agency. An Anthropological Theory*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, 17.

36 Muñoz Viñas, *Contemporary Theory of Conservation*, 29.

37 Kant understands by ‘object of pure practical reason’ ‘the idea of an object as an effect possible through freedom’. They are objects of the good and the evil, concepts that cannot be defined before the moral law is applied. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 166–67, 171.

38 Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 146.

39 Jean-Luc Nancy. *Une pensée finie*. Paris: Galilée, 1990, 33. My translation.

40 Gell, *Art and Agency*, 16.

41 Arthur C. Danto. *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981, 1–5.

42 Muñoz Viñas, *Contemporary Theory of Conservation*, 50.

43 Levi R. Bryant. *Difference and Givenness. Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2008, 167.



Retouching a painting at the Conservation Unit of the Finnish National Gallery

Photo: Finnish National Gallery / Jenni Nurminen

claims that problems should be seen instead as transcendent in relation to their solutions, since ‘problems have an immanent organisation of their own, irreducible to any particular case of solution’.⁴⁴ The problems of preservability, are equally transcendent concerning their proposed solutions. They impose their moral ‘ought’ (the category of *Sollen*) on us and require to be thought time and time again – the ethical claim has no limits. Such dilemmas ‘continue to *insist* within their solutions, the manner in which they function as imperatives’.⁴⁵

It has been argued that there is something haunting about the categorical imperative. Jean-Paul Martinon has even suggested that to think of it is to think ‘in the haunting way thought manifests itself’.⁴⁶ On the other hand, we could ask whether what we experience as haunting is precisely the material agency that affects our unconscious. The philosopher Alenka Zupančič has associated Kant’s concept of pure form (the determining ground of the will) with the Lacanian concept of the *objet petit a*, the object-cause of desire.⁴⁷ She

44 Bryant, *Difference and Givenness*, 167.

45 Bryant, *Difference and Givenness*, 165.

46 Jean-Luc Nancy. ‘The Kategorein of Excess’, in *A Finite Thinking*. Trans. James Gilbert-Walsh & Simon Sparks. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, 133–51; Jean-Paul Martinon. ‘Between Freedoms: Jean-Luc Nancy’s Haunting Categorical Imperative’, *Mono Kurgusuz Labirent*, 10–11 (Summer 2011), unpaginated, <http://jeanpaulmartinon.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Between-Freedoms-Jean-Luc-Nancy%E2%80%99s-Haunting-Categorical-Imperative.pdf> (accessed 31 December 2022).

47 Alenka Zupančič. *Ethics of the Real. Kant, Lacan*. London, New York: Verso, 2000, 17. Bernard Baas points out (*De la chose à l’objet*, 84) the *objet petit a*’s kinship with the quasi-transcendental.

suggests that Lacan's distinction between desire and need is comparable to Kant's distinction between empirical and pure form. There is a void around which the desire encircles: '[T]he *objet petit a* designates nothing but the absence, the lack of the object, the void around which desire turns.'⁴⁸ Zupančič points out that 'desire is always directed at something other than – something more than – the object demanded. After a need is satisfied, and the subject gets the demanded object desire continues on its own; it is not "extinguished" by the satisfaction of need.'⁴⁹ I leave open the question, could we think that what Muñoz Viñas calls the conservation object, which is constituted by our practical reason, has the same function as this object-cause of desire?

Conclusion

At first sight, it might seem that the criticism directed at Kant's categorical imperative – that one cannot derive a binding code of conduct from its mere concept – could also be shown to apply to Brandi's categorical imperative of conservation. However, the fact that many artworks and other heritage artefacts have been mistreated does not call into question its validity. It only makes clear that if reason completely determined the will, artworks would be treated following this imperative. The conservator is a transcendently free agent capable of deciding the determining ground of his or her will and causality of his or her deeds. The morality of conservation decisions can be judged by what has been the will to guide the conservator's actions.

48 Zupančič, *Ethics of the Real*, 18.

49 Zupančič, *Ethics of the Real*, 17–18.